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NG PU BLIC. PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
AS A TOOL FOR INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA*
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SAN' F. MOHAMMED
Asslstqnt Director,

Development Finonce Deportment
Centrol Bonk Of Nigerio

I defineO to encomPoss
I physicol structures thot focilitote
the production of goods ond
services, without themselves being

port of the production process
(Yoshino & Nokohigoshi 2000). lt

includes those components of the
interr-rol orchitecture of on
economy, 'which enobles it io
consistently grow cnd provide
increosing improvement to the
quoiity of life of lhe citizenry
(Ahmed 20ll). lt is often referred
to os the 'stock of copitol goods'
ond include highwoys, oirports,
horbors, utility production ond
distributive systems, woter ond
sewer systems, communicotion

ond energy networks.

lnfrostructure ploys o centrolrole in

improving competitiveness,

focilitoting domestic ond
internotionol trode, ond
enhoncing the continent's
integrotion into the globol
economy (AfDB,20l0).
lnfrostructure projects ore lumpy,
immobile, spoce specific ond long
losting, often with life spon

meosured

in decodes

ond

ln mony develoPing countries,
including Nigerio, roPid economic
growth is outstripping infrostructure
supply (Gupto ond Srovot, 1998).
Governments in these countries

ore unoble to fund vitol

infrostructure development ond
rehobilitotion, so theY ore
increosingly turning to lorge
internotionol firms os o source of
funding lhrough concession
controcts such os Build-OwnTronsfer (BOT) (McCowon ond
Mohornmed, 2003).

The poper nighlights the
importonce

of

inf

rostructure

development to economic growth
ond the need for government to
toke o more strotegic opprooch to
tockling its deorth in Nigerio
stressing the need to consider the
Public-Privote Portnership (PPP) os
the preferred public infrostructure
procurement option. This wos in the
light of the foct thot the troditionol

procurement methods hove
proved ineffective due to the
growing competition for limited
stote funds, ond the citizens'higher
expectotions for efficient services

in criticol sectors such os power,

fronsportotion,

woste

monogement. etc. The poper olso
reviewed the literoture on PPP, its
models, benefits ond exomples in

centuries, ond construction often
running into yeors. The implicotion
for finoncing is thot the initiol
copitol outloy tends to be quite
lorge.

jurisdictions.

Lock of infrostructure

2.0

development hos huge negotive
impoct on o country's economy

q everol studies hove

ond quolity of life. lt bosicolly stunts
growth in every sector through its
knock-on eff ect. Agriculture;
monufocturing ond energy ore
just o few of the oreos identified. lt
hos been noled thot the provision
of infrostructure is o condition for
higher rotes of economic growth
(Akinyosoye ,2O10).

Nigerio ond some other
iconomic Costs 'lf

Poor

nfroslructure

thot there

is

shown

o cleor correlotion

* between the quolity of o
country's infrostructure ond its
potentiol economic growth
(Colderon ond Serven, 2004). The
World Bonk hos estimoted thot
poor infrostructure ocross Africo
reduces economic growth by 2%
peronnum (World Bonk, 2009).

*Ihe views expresse4 in the poper ore those of the outhor ond do not in ony woy represent the officiol position or thinking of the Centrol Bonk
of Nigerio. The outhor ocknowledges the comments ond crilicisms of ononymous revrewer.
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Some of the economic costs of
poor infrostructure in Nigerio ore
summorized below:
o The indirect costs of doing
business in Nigerio hove been
estimoted of 16% of soles
compored to 2% for South
Africo ond 5% in Chino

(Business

Monitor

lnternotionol, 2010);
Nigerio scores zero out of l0 in

0

the Business Monitor

lnternotionol ossessment of
business environment

the

becouse of the severe lock of
investment in infrostructure by
government. (Business Monitor
lnternotionol, 2010);

Low GDP per copito os the
country wos ronked os the
1271h in the world, compored
to Ghono I l4th ond Moloysio
2lst (World Economic Forum,

a

2011);

Relocotion of monufocturing
gionts such os Codbury ond

t

Michelin to other countries;

Huge copitol requirements

I

ronging between USD 25 ond
USD 30 billion employed to
expond energy generotion
copocity to 30 000 MW olone
(Anyowu, 2009); etc.

The Asion Development

Bonk

noted thot o country's

infrostructure development
should omount to o minimum of
of GDP to ottoin o reosonoble
level of sustoinoble development.
Nigerio's infrostructure spending
contributed o meoger 1.9% I
6%

onnum to GDP over the lost
decode (Akinyosoye. 2010). Using
simple regression onolysis, f or
Nigerio to bridge the gop ond
reoch overoge levels of onnuoi

growths recorded omongst Asion
countries, infrostructure spending
(os o percentoge of GDP) must
increose to 18% to bridge the gop
(with Asio) in l5 yeors ond24%in 10
yeors (Akinyosoye, 201 0).

Populotion
16.72

Brc-zil

179.10

Turkey

96.8r
I .1 66.08
r40.00

lndio
Nigerio
.\orrce: CI- 1 ll'brld Fbct: Book

2009

+

o
significont period of time.ln return,

the privote entity receives o
benefii/ finoncicl remunerotion

occording to predefined

performonce criterio, which moy

be derived entirely from
government budgets, service
toriffs or user chorges, or from o
combinotion of the two"
(l

p-hill bottle towords the
development ond need to
embork upon some mojor
u

strotegic reform progroms which
puts infrostructure development
top on its list of sectors thot need
urgent ottention.

3.0
Public

The Cose for Exploiling the
- Privole Portnership (PPP) in

Nioerio

Tn" term PPP does not hove o
! legol meoning ond con be
I used to describe o wlde
voriety of orrongements involving
the public ond privote sector
working together in some woy
(Forquhorson,20l I ).
The lnternotionol Monetory Fund
(lMF) defined it os "orrongements
where the privote sector supplies
Infrostructure ossets ond services
thot troditionolly hove been
provided by the government" The
PPP Unit of Mouritius provided o
comprehensive definition of PPP.
os "o controctuol ogreement
between o public entity ond
privote entity, whereby the privote
entity performs port of o
government orgonisotion's service

l: Comporotive

nternotionol Low nstitute, 2006)
I

.

Areo
41,543
8,514,877
783,562
3287,263
923,768

Telecom
27.23
191.78

83.32
464.84
65.27

parcd ortlf rottrurcrul
atrporls
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PPPs con therefore be described
os controctuol orrongements of
voried noture where two porties
shore rights ond responsibilities
during the durotion of the
controct. Different forms of PPP
involve different combinotions of
public ond privote sector finonce
ond exposure to project risk

(Forquhorson,20l l ). PPP wos soid
to hove been initioted in Austrolio
in the lote l9B0s ond found its woy
to the UK in the 1 990s (Uff, 2005).

The chonging living styles
occosioned by ropid urbonizotion

ond the quest for technicol
development combined to moke
ond
improved infrostructure more
pressing every possing doy.
Cleorly, the troditionol budgetory

the demond for better
ollocotion f or

inf rostructure
development hos proved wholly
inodequote in meeting the
infrostructure needs of the
country. ln oddition, the public

sector
ond other
porostotols/ogencies chorged
with the responsibilities of
producing ond distributing
inf rostructurol f ocilities hove

Slock of lnfrostructure

(millions)

Netherlonds

the ossocioted risks for

From the foregoing, Nigerio hos on

Toble

Notion

delivery functions, ond ossumes

Stock of lnfrostructure
Electricity
Roil
Roods
(MW)
(km)
(km)
9,170
2,811
135,470
86,020
28,857
1,751,868
r 8,900
8,697
426,951
76,170
63,327
3,316,425
3,000
4,500
193,200

* Airports

22

718
90
251
22

Volume 35, No.

April - June

2

proved to be inefficient, lock of
cost effectiveness ond continued
relionce on gronts for sustenonce

I soliciting privote sector
porticipotion through
controcts, leoses ond
concessions.

(Akinyosoye, 20,l 0).

The typicol options for 3.'l
infrostructure finonce ore:
Direct budgetory ollocotions,

r
i

borrowing from finonciol
institutions
bonks,

t

ond development

occessing the copitol morkets,
or

Durotion of controct

Bosed

on the obove, the

concessions. 'These models vory
moinlyby:
- Ownershipofcopitolossets

Responsibilityforinvestment
Assumption of risks, ond

-

Service

ond

Monogement

controcts;
Leoses;ond
Concessions.

Toble 2 below (odopted from the

Economic ond Scientific

Porlioment) summorises the
different models

of

PPP (Rendo

ond Schrefler,2006)

Modolity
The privote porty procures, operotes ond mointoins
on osset for o short period of time. The public sector
beors finonciol ond monogement risks.
The privote sector operotes ond monoges o public
Operotion ond
monogement controcts
owned osset. Revenues for the privote porty ore
linked to performonce torgets. The public sector
beors finonciol ond investment risks
Leosing-type controcts
The privote sector buys or leoses on existing osset
o Buy-build-operote
from the government, renovotes, modernizes,
(BBo);
ond/or exponds it, ond then operotes the osset,
o Leose-develop-operote ogoin with no obligotion to tronsfer ownership bock
(LDo);
to the government
o Wrop-oround oddition
(wAA).
Build-operote-tronsfer (BOT) The privote sector designs ond builds on osset,
. Build-own-operoteoperotes it, ond then tronsfers it to the government
tronsfer (BOOT);
when the operoting controct
o Build-rent-own-tronsfer ends, or of some other pre-specified time. The
(BROT);
privote portner moy subsequently rent or leose the
. Build-leose-operoteosset from the government
tronsfer (BLOT);
. Build-tronsfer-operote
Scheme
Service controcts

Operote

.

o
.

(DBFO)

Build-own-operote
(Qoo);
Build-develop-operote
(BDo);
Design-constructmonoge-finonce

The privote sector designs, builds, owns, develops,
operotes ond monoges on osse t with no obligotion
to tronsfer ownership to the government. These ore

vorionts of design -buildJinonce operote (DBFO)
schemes.

(DCMF).
Sorrce: Elaboratnn on

IMF (2004) atd

European Connrnon (2003)

5

PolicY

Directorote of the Europeon Union

Toble 2

{BTo).
Design-Build-Finonce-

PPP

models con be clossified into three

brood cotegories. They ore:

Models
PPP models vory from shortPPP

Tfre
monogement
I t"rrn simple
I controcts (with or without
investment requirements) to longterm ond very comPlex
-

20ll

Volume 35, No.2

Aprll - June 201

Regulotory Commission to
3.2 Benefits of PPPs
o Public-Privote Portnerships regulote, monitor ond supervise
(PPP) orrongements ore

moinly driven by limitotions in
public funds for investmenis
ond the desire to increose
efficiency of spending ond the
quolity of public services.
a

PPP could be o tool for
reforming procurement ond

public service delivery
(Forquhorson,20l l).

0

PPPs

hove been explored to

provide infrostructure such os

principles, institutionol fromework,
ond the roles of stokeholders in the
PPP in the country. The document
describes the processes by which
the privote sectorwillbe invited to
bid for the creotion of new
infrostructure, ond the institutionol

telecommunicotions, gos ond
electricity, schools, hospitols,
prisons ond even militory boses
(lnternotionol Low lnstitute,

on opprovol

PPPs

in sociol sectors such os

upgrode the country's tertiory

while such orrongements for
the heolth sector could
improve potient core ond

process for PPP
projects which is designed to
ensure thot only finonciolly vioble
projects ore brought to the
morket. A PPP Resource Centre
within lnfrostrucfure Goncession
Regulotory Commission (ICRC)
Agencies (MDAs)

of the

Federol

Government in the preporotion
ond procurement of these
projects (Ahmed,

201 0).

role of the Public
increosed occess/ 3.4 The
Sector
ottendonce of public
overnments hove
/heolthcore focilities.
been the
I
-troditionolly
providers
of
\-/oo.inont
PPPs moximizes use of privote
infrostructure in most economies
sectorfinonce ond skills; ond
of the world. However, stotehelps olleviote the, chronic
underinvestment in copitol
intensive projects ond ollows
off bolonce sheet bonowing

3.3 Ihe

Legol Fromework for

in Nigerio
lnfrostructure Concession

PPP

fhe
I Regulotory Commission
I lrstoOlisr,ment, etc) Act of
2OO5

provides for the porticipotion

of privote sector in finoncing the

construction, development,

operotion, or mointenonce of
infrostructure or development

projects of the Federol

Government through concession
or controctuol onongements; ond

the estoblishment of the
infrostructure Concession

but economicolly/commerciolly

unvioble.

3.5

of the Privqte
Seclor
Th" four principol roles for the
II privote sector in PPP schemes
os specified in the Guidelines
for Successful PPP, published by
the Europeon Commission in 2003
(poge 4) ore:
o to provide odditionolcopitol;

owned enterprises, often chorged
with the responsibility of supplying
such services were found to be
inef f icient, overstof f ed ond
required subsidies to mointoin
operotions. The World Bonk
reported thot mispricing ond
technicol inefficiency in stote
utilities resulted in onnuol loss of

.

optimol use of resources.

6

The odvontoges of using
PPP orrongemenls ore
summed up osfollows:

3.6

s stoied in the

EU

Guidelines for Successful
PPP (poges l4-16), the
odvontoges of using PPP ore

summorized os follows:
a

Accelerofion of infrostructure
provision - PPPs often ollow the

to implement
development projects without
government

necessorily using its resources.

Thls eno bles projects to
proceed when the ovoilobility

of public copitol moy be
constroined (either by public
spending cops or onnuol

budgeting cycles), thus
bringing forword much
needed investment.

a

-

the

sector, coupled with its

less

Fosfer implementolion
ef

f

iciency of the privote

bureoucrotic setup usuolly

Under the PPP orrongements, the

policies ond lows to focilitote the
gronling ond monitoring of the
concession or other ogreements.
Other responsibilities of the
government ore consumer
protecfion ond the provision of

implementotion skills;
to provide volue odded to the
consumer ond the public ot
lorge;

o to provide better
identificotion of needs ond

$'180 billion (Kessides, 2OO4).

government retoins control
through the provision of bosic

The role

o to provide olternotive
monogement
ond

procured. The Policy olso sets out

the educotion hos the hos been set up to provide support
potentiol to improve the
leorning environment ond to Ministries, Deportments, ond
institutions to world closs stotus

r

of the ICRC thot
the policy objectives,

document
specifies

fromework within which new
projects will be developed ond

20r r ).

o

on Public
Privote Portnership is the working

The Notionol Policy

roods, ports, oirports woter

ond sewer systems,

o

the controcts on infrostructure or
development projects.

some form of finonciol support to
projectS thot ore sociolly desiroble

leod to foster implementotion
of projects

I

Reduced whole /ife cos/s - ppp

projects which require

operotionol
ond
mointenonce service

provision provide the privote

I
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sectorwith strong inceniives to
minimise costs cver lhe whoie
life of c project, o feoture
inherently difficuit to ochieve
within the troditionol public
sector budgeting.

resporisibiiity for ProvicJing
pubiic services, governmeni
officicls will oct cs regulctors
ond will focus upon service
picnnir-rg cnd performoi'ice

Belfer risk oilocotion - o core
principle of ony PPP is the
ollocotion of risk to the portY
best oble to monoge it of leost
cost. The oim is to optimise
rother thcn trroximise risk
tronster, lo ensui'e thot best
voh-le rs ochieved.

doy delivenT of public services.
ln oodition, by exposing public
set;ices to conrperition, PPPs
eiroble ihe ccst of Pubiic
sei'vices to be benchmorked
ogcinst rnci'ket stondords to
ensure thoi the very best volue
for money is being ochieved.

Better incenlives to perform

the ollocotion of project

-

oi'ing insteod cf the
monogement of the doY tc
nnonif

4.0

PPP

risk

projects, full poyment to the
privote sector controctor will
only occur if the required
service stondords ore being
meton on ongoing bosis.
a

lmproved quolity of service
service ochieved under o

l-operoted in different

ond in different countries of the
a

t

PPP

is often better thon thot
ochieved by troditionol
procurement methods.

This

moy reflect the better
integrotion of services with

supporting ossets, improved
economies of scole, the
introduction of innovotion in
service delivery. or the
performonce incentives ond
penolties typicolly included
within o PPP controct.
a

Generolion of odditionol
revenues

-

a

0

I

detoils, but tyPicollY involve
investment by o Privote

- the PFI Provider- in
new, rebuilt or refurbished

consortium

infrostructure such os highwoY or
port.
ln the PFI rnodel, the public sector

purchoses the services from the
privote seclor through o long-term
ogreement. PFI projects lherefore,
beor direct finonciol obligotions to
government. ln oddition, explicit

ond implicit conlingent liobilities
moy olso orise due to loon
guorontees provided to lenders for
possible defoult of o public or
privote entity on non-guoronfeed

loons. Aport from building
economic infrostructure, the PFI

borrels/doy Petroleum

direct "revenues". ln essence, the
PFI provides o woy of funding
mojor copitol investments, without
immediote recourse to the public

Refinery.

purse.

The Chod - Comeroun

The U.K.'s Privote Finonce lnitiotive

Euro Disney (Disneylond Poris)

ond delivery of public services
since the eorly 90's. By 2007, more
thon 870 projects worth l65.5bn
hod been procured os PFls (The UK
Treosury lnfrostructure Unit, 20 I 0).

- o

holidoy

The A4 Motorwoy, Polond

- 570
km rood which runs from west
to eost Polond.

odditionol revenues from third
porties. thereby reducing the
cosf of ony public sector

0

Additionol revenue moy be
generoted through the use of
spore copocity or the disposol

4.1

cf surplus ossets.

fot'

improving ond modernising Public
services. PFI schemes cjiifer in iheir

Petrozuorto Project,
Venezuelo: 120,000

Project, Fronce

moy be oble to generote

government's strotegY

model hos been used olso for
developing sociol infrostructure
such os school ond hospitol
buildings, which do not generote

ond recreotion resort;

t

represenls o fcrm of PPP thot hos
become o key elerrrenl of the UK

The Drox Power Stotion
Drox) - 3,960 MW cool fired
power plont in Yorkshire,
Englond thot provides 7% of
U K's electricity supply.
(AES

Petroleum Development ond
Pipeline Project (Chod) - o
1,070 pipeline to tronsport
crude from Southern Chod to
Comeroun.

the privote sector

subvention required.

sectors

world.

-

internotionol experience
suggests thot the quolity of

Projects

I istea below ore some PPP
I projects thot were being

should incentivise o privote
sector controctor to improve

its monogement ond
performonce on ony given
project. Under most PPP

Exomples of lnlernotionol

20ll

Dobhol Power Plont, lndio

-

2,185 MW power plont built by
Enron ond Generol Electric.

Privole Finonce lniliolive in
the United Kingdom (UK)

Enhonced pubiic

Privote Finonce lnitiotive
Th" nt)
wos initioted o nd
iP
It populorised
in the United

monogernenf - by tronsferring

Kingdom (UK) in the eorly 1990s. lt

(PFl) progrom hos ployed on
importont role in the procurement

4.2

Exomple of Successful

PPP

in Nigerio: Murtolo
Muhommed Airporl
Terminol2 (MMA2)

Federol Government of
fneNigerio
oworded 36 yeor
I
I concession to develop,
finonce, monoge ond operote the
locolwing of Murtolo Muhommed
Airport (MMA2) ond oncillory
ossets under the Built-Operote ond
Tronsfer (BOT) orrongement in
2003. lt wos the first mojor BOT
project in Nigerio (Bobolokin,
2008). The prolect comprised the
Airport Terminol building, o multi -

Volume 35. No.2
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storey cor pork ond on opron. lt

is

presently the best Airport terminol
with the copocity to hold up to
4.000 possengers in the country.

4.3 The Logos Stole Exomple:
ogos Stole projected thot it
I requires
obout $50bn for
I nfrostructure
l-i
renewol/development to support
our desired growth over o ten
yeor period (Fosholo, 20 I 0).

The Logos Stote Government
enocted the Logos Stote

Roods,

Bridges ond Highwoy

lnfrostructure (Privote Sector
Porticipotion) Development
Boord Low to provide o legol
fromework for privote sector
finoncing of certoin infrostructure.
It wos the first time in Nigerio thot
ony sub-notionol government hos
enocted o low specificolly to
regulote privote sector finoncing
for infrostructure development
ond mointenonce (Okoro ond
Atekebo,2006).

Through PPP, Logos Stote hos
recorded mojor strides storting
with the AES 270 MW lndependent
Power Plont (lPP) to the first Bus
Ropid Tronsit (BRT) system ond the
first mojor concessioned rood - the
Lekki/Epe Highwoy (Fosholo,

o win-win-win solution for operotion. PPPs olso require

governments, privote sector firms,
ond the community of lorge. From
the government's perspective,
privote sector porticipotion offers
off bolonce-sheet funding whilst
bringing on odded odvontoge of
cost ond resource efficiency to
the project. From the privote
sector's perspective, BOT projects
present greot opportunities to
expond morket shore ond eorn
higher returns. Finolly, through user
poy system, only the users of the
infrostructure focility poys for the
services rendered, thus freeing

toxpoyers' money for other
competing demonds (McCowon
ond Mohommed,2003).

be ocknowledged thot the
Federol Government of Nigerio
ond few stote governments such
os Logos ond Rivers Stotes hove
storted exploring opportunities for
topping into privote finoncing thot
It must

resulted in operotionol
concessions in some criticol

sectors thot include tronsportotion
ond power. This strotegic shift hos

come obout on the reolizotion
thot scoling up finoncing from
troditionol sources olone would
not be odequote to close the
mossive infrostructure gop in the
country.

20 r 0).

5.0

Conclusion
projects procured
nfrostructure
!
! vio concession controcts ore

I increosingly becoming the
preferred option in developing
countries (McCowon ond
Mohommed, 2003). lt hos olso
been observed thot if procured
properly, the BOT option presents

potentiol benefit of o
PPP project will depend on the
type of project being undertoken
ond the exoct terms of the
controct governing the PPP. lt is
importont to note thot public
bodies hove o criticol role to ploy

The scope of

in the monogement ond
of PPP during their
design, construction ond

regulotion

8

effective controct monitoring
procedures to ensure thot

controctuol obligotions continue
to be met in terms of both quolity
ond timlng.

Although PPPs con present o
number of odvontoges, it hos to
be opprooched with coution os
occording to the Europeon
Commission report:

"it

must

be remembered

thot

these schemes ore olso complex

to design, implement ond
monoge. They ore by no meons
the only or the preferred option
ond should only be considered if it

con be demonstroted thot they
will ochieve odditionol volue

compored

with other

opprooches. if there is on
effective implementotion
structure ond if the objectives of
oll porties con be met within the
portnership."

lndeed,

PPP ollows for

the finonce

ond operotionol burden to be
tronsferred from the public to the privote sector. ln return
government is oble to focus on
strotegic oreos like policy moking,
plonning ond demond risk. This is
importont os governments hove

better leveroge on demond
through ottroctive policies

(Akinyosoye, 2010). The key
leorning point is thot for PPP to

flourish os o preferred

procurement ond development
option in Nigerio, they need to be
bosed on firm policy foundotions,
o long-term politicol commitment,
ond sound ond predictoble legol
ond regulotory environment.
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